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Abstract: Do we really understand life after genocide? A reflection on the construc-
tion of knowledge in and on Rwanda reveals that it is rife with contradictory as-
sertions and images, and that there is a discrepancy between image and reality. 
This article attempts to map the center(s) of knowledge construction in postgeno-
cide Rwanda, the place not only where policy is made, but also where knowledge 
is actively construed, managed, and controlled. It argues that an overall cultivation 
of the aesthetics of progress and a culturally specific communication code have 
contributed to an active interference in the scientific construction of knowledge. 
It stresses the need for scholars and observers to reveal the social and historical 
context for the knowledge being generated. It also urges them to physically and 
mentally move away from the center of society: to adopt a bottom-up perspective 
that captures the voices of ordinary people. 
 
Introduction
The postgenocide Rwandan regime is often hailed for its remarkable so-
cioeconomic recovery after the total destruction it experienced in 1994. 
At the same time, however, the regime is often portrayed as increasingly 
authoritarian, with political dignitaries, ordinary people, and members of 
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the international community all submissive to the rules, regulations, and 
discourses laid out for them as in a “rehearsed participation in public af-
fairs” (African Peer Review Mechanism 2005:58). One can find the most 
divergent claims and conclusions on all themes constituting the postcon-
flict agenda, notably on issues of justice, security, and development, with 
governance in general as the underlying factor (Uvin 2007:41). The lack 
of consensus on the postconflict achievements and essential components 
of Rwandan society signals the apparent difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
separating image from reality, the imaginary from the real.
 As a researcher, I undertook more than twenty months of fieldwork 
in rural Rwanda between 2004 and 2008. This article is a reflection on the 
practice of doing research in and on Rwanda. It is equally a reflection on 
the way knowledge is being generated in and on Rwanda, an issue previ-
ously analyzed by Pottier (2002). A combination of obstacles encountered 
during fieldwork necessitates this reflection. First and foremost, there is 
the difficulty of gaining access to the “field”—a term that refers not only 
to the geographical area of Rwandan rural life, where the majority of the 
population lives, but also to the thematic domain of research topics, such as 
ethnicity, governance, justice, poverty, inequality, and democracy. Due to a 
range of reasons that will be explored in this article, these topics are largely 
under- or unexplored variables in postgenocide Rwanda. Second, this ar-
ticle grew out of frustration over the sheer impossibility of communicating 
my findings to the foreign residents of Kigali on the nature of rural life 
and the undercurrents of social processes at work. Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, 
functions as an outpost of progress where Rwanda is presented and expe-
rienced as the beacon of hope, development, and change on the African 
continent. Rwanda has indeed experienced a gigantic leap forward since 
the total destruction experienced in 1994. Nevertheless, more discouraging 
trends often remain hidden and can be discerned only by looking beyond 
surface appearances, as difficult as such an exercise may be.
 In Rwanda, as in many African societies and political situations, it is 
important to take into account the dialectic of transparency and conspir-
acy (West & Sanders 2003), the interplay of truth and lies (de Lame 2004; 
Turner 2005, 2008; Ingelaere 2009), and the presence of the invisible in 
the visible (Mbembe 2001; De Boeck & Plissart 2005). In particular, there 
is a problem in Rwanda of taking the “mise-en-scène,” or stage-setting, for 
granted, instead of searching for and capturing the meaning and overall di-
rection of life. Such difficulties in interpretation are widespread, as the lit-
erature on Rwanda shows; in a society in which daily life itself is politicized, 
it is difficult for an observer to interpret or gain a balanced understanding 
of the social milieu. An active interference in the scientific construction 
of knowledge, the cultivation of an aesthetics of progress, and a culturally 
specific ethics of communication all lie at the heart of difficulties in under-
standing life after genocide.
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Gourevitch’s “The Life After” as Case-Study 
Philip Gourevitch’s well-known article on Rwanda, entitled “The Life Af-
ter” (Gourevitch 2009a), offers important testimony about the difficulties 
in understanding postgenocide Rwanda.1 Gourevitch had been a reporter 
in Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and published a 
widely read book (Gourevitch 1999) that was severely criticized for its one-
dimensional understanding, or at least rendering, of the situation in the 
country (Pottier 2002:56–57,168–69).2 A 2009 trip brought him back to 
Rwanda where, as the subtitle of the article suggests, he found that “the 
reconciliation defies expectations” and that “there is a possibility of peace.” 
Those claims, however, represented the replacement of reality with image, 
facts with discourse. Although Gourevitch reported interesting and reveal-
ing encounters and insights achieved during a trip to the countryside, he 
was unable (or unwilling) in this second publication to question surface 
appearances and the discourse of the new Rwandan elite.
 Gourevitch begins his article with an overview of the achievements of 
Rwanda’s leadership and the positive trends in Rwandan society: 
On the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide, Rwanda is one of the saf-
est and the most orderly countries in Africa. Since 1994, per-capita gross 
domestic product has nearly tripled, even as the population has increased 
by nearly twenty-five per cent, to more than ten million. There is national 
health insurance, and a steadily improving education system. Tourism is 
a boom industry and a strong draw for foreign capital investment. In Ki-
gali, the capital, whisk-broom-wielding women in frocks and gloves sweep 
the streets at dawn. Plastic bags are outlawed, to keep litter under control 
and to protect the environment. Broadband internet service is widespread 
in the cities, and networks are being extended into the countryside. Cell 
phones work nearly everywhere. Traffic police enforce speed limits and 
the mandatory use of seat belts and motorbike helmets. Government of-
ficials are required to be at their desks by seven in the morning. It is the 
only government on earth in which the majority of parliamentarians are 
women. Soldiers are almost nowhere to be seen.…” (2009a:37–38)
On the next page he adds a bucolic touch:
Where I remembered an empty valley overgrown with bush, there were 
now neatly planted fields of beans, manioc, and sorghum, dotted with 
men hoeing and women stooping to harvest and reseed—a saw mill here, 
a livestock corral there. Old buildings were missing, new buildings were 
everywhere, and places where I’d never seen anyone were crowded with 
foot traffic. Much was familiar. Indeed, much felt eternal: the rise and fall 
of the sweeping, vaguely Tuscan vistas—rigorously terraced hills, pocked 
by low stands of banana trees and an occasional towering eucalyptus, with 
farmhouses clinging to the slopes, and every so often an imposing red 
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brick church on the summit, its bell tower cut against a hazy, cloud-spat-
tered sky. (2009a:39)
 These descriptions reflect what can indeed be observed in Rwanda—
although the observer may have been impressed more by window dressing 
than by real developments, and the descriptions of the Rwandan country-
side are heavily embellished by his own lyricism. Even more problematic 
is his reiteration of the claims made by the Rwandan leaders who were his 
usual interlocutors and guides. Kagame himself tells him that “Ten mil-
lion people now in this country have never been happier in the history of 
this country. It’s better, Rwanda, far better than it has ever been. I have no 
doubt about that.” Kagame instructs him “to look around, go around, go to 
the villages,” assuring him that if he fails “to see the sense of hope in their 
eyes, then I won’t be telling you the truth” (Gourevitch 2009a:38).
 Gourevitch does go into the countryside, albeit for a brief visit.3 But 
despite his general conclusions, his visual impressions and the narratives 
he hears are clearly rife with fear, distrust, and a lack of empathy for oth-
ers. What he subsequently describes related to the Gacaca process and the 
perception of ordinary life is what everybody who has spent a significant 
amount of time in the rural areas of Rwanda has to conclude: that nobody 
likes Gacaca, it is not working very well, and it is bringing neither reconcili-
ation nor justice. Survivors hear about reconciliation on the radio, but such 
talk will not bring back their family. A former killer named Girumuhatse 
explains that reconciliation and confession are “a program of the state.” A 
survivor named Mariane dismisses requests for pardon as theater, a per-
formance in the interest of the government. Another survivor questioned 
about how he manages to live alongside neighbors released from prison 
who had been the killers of his family members says that, in fact, he is not 
managing at all, he just pretends to get along. Gourevitch’s friend in Ki-
gali confirms that “they talk about reconciliation, but that it is the reverse.” 
The picture Gourevitch presents is only a snapshot of Rwandan life—and 
in other contexts (such as his New York Times commentary on Abu Ghraib 
[2009b]), he himself has expressed wariness about the accuracy of such 
superficial reports. Nevertheless, even the mere snapshot he presents here 
is rather a bleak one, contrary to his overall message.4
  Gourevitch is honest when he says at one point that he “didn’t see any 
great hope in the eyes of the people I visited” (Gourevitch 2009a:42). And 
it is true that survivors do tell him that life in Rwanda is better than it was 
twelve years ago. But life twelve years earlier had consisted of the apocalypse. 
And his informants also add that “economically, it was better before ’94” 
(2009a:42). Gourevitch raises this issue during his talk with Rwarakabije, 
the former military commander in the Rwandan army under the previous 
regime of President Habyarimana, who later headed the armed rebellion 
against the new regime but then joined the new Rwandan national army. 
But when asked whether life today is better than it was before the genocide, 
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Rwarakabije does not even respond. Indeed, Gourevitch finds evidence that 
the sentiments behind the 1994 violence are still present, and that a large 
part of the population does not feel liberated by the military overthrow of 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994. On the contrary, many suggest 
that they look forward to a liberation from the RPF, not by the RPF.
 Gourevitch mentions accusations lodged again Rwarakabije by a sur-
vivor who accuses him of participation in the genocide; these charges, ex-
pressed during a commemoration ceremony attended by the president and 
other dignitaries, are probably well-founded. Kagame himself admits that 
Rwarakabije escaped prosecution in the postgenocide justice system and 
that for reasons of expediency he was instead recycled into the new regime. 
Transitional justice, in this way, is a politicized process; respect for survi-
vors is overridden by questions of power. Yet if ordinary Hutu acted with 
that kind of disrespect, they would be accused of the crime of perpetuating 
“genocide ideology” (Republic of Rwanda 2006a).5 Gourevitch, however, 
fails to ask the large questions: Why is the justice system unable to change 
the protected status of people who are currently in the grace of the regime? 
What does this reveal about the entire justice system in Rwanda? Doesn’t 
this attitude and approach explain the sentiments expressed by people in 
the countryside? To answer these questions, however, Gourevitch would 
have had to move away imaginatively and intellectually from the center of 
society where knowledge on Rwanda is constructed. He would have had 
to question what is immediately visible and start searching for the actual 
meaning and direction of Rwandan life after genocide. 
Understanding Justice, Governance, and Development in Rwanda: A 
Difficult Exercise
In all likelihood, the reason that Gourevitch fails to ask these questions is 
not only because of unwillingness. It is also the result of factors that make it 
difficult for many people to understand the meaning of life after genocide. 
Indeed, the tension we see in Gourevitch’s work can be observed by com-
paring a number of studies on Rwanda. After the consolidation of the po-
litical transition in the 2003 presidential elections, Reyntjens reported on 
“cosmetic operations for international consumption” in the context of what 
actually was a dictatorship and “a fertile breeding ground for structural 
violence” (2004:210). Stephen Kinzer (2008), by contrast, found in post-
genocide Rwanda and the leadership of Paul Kagame an entirely opposite 
situation: not a closed and repressive regime, but rather visionary leader-
ship fully equipped to pull the country out of poverty in a generation or so. 
Similarly, World Bank researchers, noting in 2003 that “considerable prog-
ress has been achieved over the last ten years in a range of areas” (2004:1), 
anticipated a macro-level economic recovery and concluded that “social in-
dicators are clearly improving for Rwanda’s next generation” (World Bank 
2004:1). An Ansoms (2008), however, questioned whether this better fu-
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ture for Rwanda’s next generation would also include the rural poor, since 
growth policies are less pro-poor than the rhetoric suggests, and survey re-
sults reveal growing inequality since 2002 (Republic of Rwanda 2006). 
 The postgenocide Rwandan way of dealing with the past, and the Ga-
caca process in particular, has received wide attention as well, often with 
the same diverging analysis. The World Bank report (2004) refers to sig-
nificant steps forward in the domain of reconciliation and asserts that the 
Gacaca court system has been “instrumental in advancing reconciliation 
and accountability following the genocide.” Some argue that the Gacaca 
process not only fosters reconciliation, but also initiates a democratic cul-
ture of deliberation and dialogue (Wierzynska 2004). Others, however, see 
Gacaca as “an exercise in victor’s justice, coercing participation, restricting 
freedom of speech on sensitive subjects, and collectivizing guilt” (Waldorf 
2006:85). While a minister in 2007 claimed that 75 percent of Rwandans 
are reconciled (New Times, April 12, 2007), others dismiss the reconciliation 
process, stating that postgenocide justice in Rwanda consists of a return to 
feudal structures and subordination for the Hutu (Centre de lutte contre 
l’impuntié et l’injustice au Rwanda 2005). In a more recent discussion on 
the nature of the Rwandan justice system, Human Rights Watch concluded 
after three years of research that it operates in a political context that is 
detrimental to fair trial guarantees and that “there is an official antipathy 
to views diverging from those of the government and the dominant party” 
(Human Rights Watch 2008:2). William Shabas, however, who undertook 
the same exercise, refutes most of the claims by Human Rights Watch and 
summarized certain perspectives on Rwanda as “unrealistic assessments of 
problems that are more imaginary than real” (Shabas 2008:59). 
 Considering these divergent accounts, one almost wonders whether 
these observers are looking at the same country. The lack of consensus sig-
nals an apparent difficulty, if not impossibility, in separating image from re-
ality and distinguishing the imaginary from the real, even in well-researched 
reports and scientific writings. As with the tensions in Gourevitch’s text on 
the life after genocide, the question is: why?
The “Scientific” Construction of Knowledge: Four Examples 
In some cases, the differences in understanding Rwanda and the conclu-
sions about the achievements in the postgenocide period can be attributed 
to a politically motivated, hidden agenda that necessitates twisting the evi-
dence or being selective in the sources. An example is the pseudoscientific 
document presented by the new “Friends of Rwanda” (Friends of Rwanda 
n.d.), which minimizes the problems in important issues of governance and 
rationalizes the nature and scale of the violence and human rights abuses 
committed by the RPF. The previous regime also has its friends, who are 
equally selective in their sources and equally biased in their reading of his-
tory. Some deliberately minimize what happened in Rwanda in 1994, are 
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equivocal on the locus of responsibility for the 1994 carnage, and fail to 
acknowledge the improvements since the years of total destruction (see, 
e.g., Péan 2005). Such documents, of course, are easily unmasked as mo-
tivated and biased. But even fact-finding reports—including those derived 
from large-scale research projects carried out with scientifically sound pro-
cedures—often give rise to controversy and receive an almost standardized 
denial when conclusions are not in line with official discourse (see Pottier 
2004; New Times 2008).6 Deniability is more difficult in these cases, and the 
intervention is more complex, but the result is similar.
 A major problem is that despite the “explosion of writing on this hither-
to almost unknown country” that has been produced since mid-1994 (Uvin 
2001:76), studies of Rwanda and the genocide have been primarily “top-
down.” Because of its dramatic history and almost mediagenic qualities, 
Rwanda is highly “popular” with researchers, compared to, for example, 
neighboring Burundi. The relative regime stability, the good security situa-
tion (the absence of war and other forms of physical violence), and the ef-
ficient administrative structures constitute necessary prerequisites for most 
research activities, and Rwanda has become almost a research haven, often 
for graduate students. Yet the knife cuts both ways. The fact that the state 
apparatus functions as a well-oiled machine results in the omnipresence 
of its ears and eyes and substantial control over what can and cannot be 
studied. Large-scale research projects of all sorts exist, but what is lacking 
is local-level research and analysis of the micro-level processes at work in 
smaller communities (Uvin 2001:97–98; see also Longman 2004). 
 The following four cases provide examples of the problems noted 
above. The first two are well known, as the findings, albeit refuted, were 
made public; in the latter two cases, interference occurred before the re-
sults were published and the research findings were never released. 
The United Nations World Food Program (WFP)
In the first months of 2006, a famine struck the food-producing region of 
Bugesera, located in northern Burundi and southern Rwanda. The World 
Food Program issued a report with alarming figures based on its own re-
search (Panapress 2006a). At the time, I was undertaking field research in 
villages located in that part of Rwanda, so I had first-hand evidence that 
hunger was rife among the population and that some people had resorted 
to eating grass and weeds. The Burundian government acknowledged the 
problem, requested assistance from international aid agencies, and urged 
Burundians to help their fellow compatriots in need (Panapress 2006b). 
But even though this is an agricultural and climatic zone shared by both 
countries, the response of Rwandan officials was to refute the claims and 
to argue that the data were incorrect (New Times 2006). A report by the 
International Federation of the Red Cross released only in 2007 revealed 
that the Red Cross had launched an emergency appeal in 2006 to assist 
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vulnerable families and that eventually food distribution did take place. It 
seems clear that the Rwandan officials initially denied the report and the 
existence of hunger not because they believed the data were incorrect, but 
because the data contradicted the vision they were promoting both inter-
nally and externally: of a hearty, self-sufficient country experiencing prog-
ress and development.7
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
The Human Development Report issued in 2007 by the UNDP entitled 
Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Develop-
ment acknowledged that Rwanda has experienced substantial growth since 
the end of the genocide. The report also states that the global Millenni-
um Development Goals or the Rwandan equivalent (“Vision 2020”) might 
well be reached in the future. At the same time, the report identified some 
serious shortcomings and crucial challenges, including a rise in absolute 
poverty and inequality levels, and the need for greater investment in the 
agricultural sector. In addition, it claimed that the quality of governance 
and depth of democracy needed to be improved to guarantee long-term 
stability. This report was not accepted by the Rwandan cabinet. The min-
ister in charge of economy was asked to refute it and he promptly did so, 
even after having written the introduction to the report himself. The UNDP 
was also pressured to release a statement saying that the report contained 
unfounded and misleading information and that the lead researchers—a 
Rwandan and foreign national—were henceforth “blacklisted” (New Times 
2007b). 
The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC)
For several years the Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Com-
mission has been undertaking large-scale surveys on factors affecting so-
cial cohesion and reconciliation. This work has been carried out through 
a specialized international NGO and is financed by important donors. As 
the results of initial surveys became available after some time, the study 
design was adapted in such a way that longer-term changes could be identi-
fied concerning specific themes and topics in the research. However, since 
the start of the Gacaca activities nationwide in 2005, the survey results have 
stopped being disseminated to a wider audience. The official reason for 
withholding the findings is that the commission wishes to collect the re-
sults from several years into one volume, with the aim of producing a more 
comprehensive overview. Nevertheless, one unauthorized version of the re-
port has been circulating in diplomatic circles, and its content—a highly 
critical assessment of the impact of Gacaca activities on social cohesion and 
reconciliation in Rwanda in 2005–2006—suggests that the delay was likely 
occasioned by the nature of the findings. That is, the report contradicts the 
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dominant, government-promoted discourse on the Gacaca process (Repub-
lic of Rwanda 2007). In the same period a government minister referred to 
encouraging statistics, asserting that 75 percent of the population had be-
come reconciled (New Times 2007a). Eventually an official report was made 
public in 2008, probably because the existence (although not most of the 
contents) of these survey results had become known. Increasing requests by 
donors interested in social developments in the country and NGOs working 
in the domain of reconciliation also necessitated the release of the findings. 
The report (Republic of Rwanda 2008) outlines the main results already re-
vealed in the previous unauthorized version, and apart from some positive 
developments related to specific themes, it presents an overall bleak picture 
of the impact of the Gacaca process on social cohesion. Its release was not 
widely publicized, however, and it went unnoticed by a wider audience. 
 Importantly, the report concludes with the assertion that “it is important 
for analysts and policy-makers to properly ‘read’ these sentiments, [and] tri-
angulate them with other information or data that this survey cannot pro-
vide” (Republic of Rwanda 2008:79). A footnote suggests that qualitative 
individual interviews or focus groups could provide especially important 
additional insights. This is a strange suggestion, since such efforts had been 
undertaken in 2006 by the same NURC in order to better understand the 
quantitative results.8 However, the remark becomes meaningful when one 
considers that the findings were not made public because of ideological 
or political reasons. The results of the qualitative research provided useful 
insights into the reasons for some unexplored tendencies and unexpected 
negative opinions by survivors or prisoners. Narratives from the qualita-
tive research provided information about the reasons that 80 percent of 
respondents questioned the veracity of testimonies in Gacaca in the 2006 
survey. Yet a government official responded that the findings gathered dur-
ing these focus group discussions, which elucidated why people did not be-
lieve that the truth was surfacing in the Gacaca activities, were irrelevant.9 
The findings of these group discussions were never made public. 
The World Bank
In 2005 the World Bank embarked on a heavily financed and innovative 
multicountry study of micro-level and longitudinal determinants of move-
ments out of poverty. The idea was to replicate the research design and 
methodology across different countries and thus to allow for cross-country 
comparisons. Rwanda was one of the countries selected for the research, 
along with Tanzania, Uganda, Senegal, Mexico, India, Afghanistan, China, 
and some others.10 An underlying goal of this research was to explore the 
“expansion of freedoms” as elucidated by Amartya Sen (1999), the exercise 
of basic rights, and the success or failure of democratic institutions in dif-
ferent countries. In Rwanda, the study employed survey techniques that 
captured and compared longitudinal data from before the genocide and 
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from 2005. It was also based on qualitative interviews and observations of 
participatory decision-making at local and national levels. After six months 
of study and the collection of hundreds of survey questionnaires and re-
sponses from numerous primary data sources, the Rwandan security forc-
es seized at least half of the data on the pretext that “genocide ideology” 
lurked in the research design and study content.11 Rwandan participants 
were questioned by the police, and foreign researchers implementing the 
study were summoned by the Criminal Investigations Department (CID). 
After a long period of negotiation between high-level World Bank repre-
sentatives and several Rwandan ministers and other government officials, 
the decision was taken to destroy all the data and abandon the research 
project altogether. It was clear that the results of the research could be 
harmful for the Rwandan establishment, since questions about democracy 
and freedom were central to the study, while the longitudinal design made 
a comparison between pre- and postgenocide Rwanda possible. Apparently, 
this was seen as undesirable for fear of unfavorable comparisons. The raw 
data were never analyzed.
The Aesthetics of Progress
The above examples uncover the politicized nature of research in Rwanda, 
both in terms of what the government itself produces and what it allows 
respected international organizations to produce. This ideological control 
over the discourse is not limited to official documents, however, as we saw 
in the case of Phillip Gourevitch. It extends to a more subtle control over 
the reports written by journalists and other eye-witnesses presenting first-
person accounts. In his book A Thousand Hills, Stephen Kinzer claims that 
“the Rwanda that foreigners who live there see is the real one” (2008:331). 
But a close examination of his work reveals that he did not speak with ordi-
nary Rwandans, and in fact, that he mostly speaks for them in the book (see 
Thomson 2009b:196). His account is based on what he saw and heard, but 
most of his conversations took place in the urban and posh environment 
of the Hotel Des Milles Collines in the capital of Kigali, and most of his in-
terlocutors were either other foreigners or members of the Rwandan elite. 
Indeed, most Rwandan observers and foreigners working in the country are 
reluctant to leave the beaten track and never really cross the rural–urban 
divide. The occasional visitor is even more confined to the urban sphere, of-
ten gleaning only superficial, snapshot impressions of what lies beyond the 
capital city. Thus there is an urban bias in the understanding of Rwanda. 
In fact, a global assessment of the working of the Department of Interna-
tional Development (DFID), the agency representing the United Kingdom 
(Rwanda’s biggest donor), reveals that compared with all other DFID em-
ployees in the world, the staff members stationed in Rwanda spend the few-
est number of working days in rural areas outside the capital station—only 
one day a year (National Audit Office 2007:27).12 (They are tied only with 
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the staff working in Afghanistan, where there are undoubtedly good rea-
sons to avoid the countryside.) The auditor recommends the conducting 
of regular “reality checks” in all locations where DFID is present in order to 
understand how its programs are affecting poor peoples’ lives. 
 Yet even with effort and the best of intentions, such a “reality check” 
is hard to accomplish in Rwanda. For even if one ventures into the coun-
tryside, one is faced with the national ideology and vision of progress as it 
has been translated onto the local level. The national discourse, in other 
words, is controlled not just by active censorship and coercion, but also by 
subtle manipulations of image and perception.13 Table 1, for example, de-
tails a proposal from a district mayor enumerating a range of forbidden or 
compulsory activities and the concomitant fines that would be imposed for 
infractions. These would include such “crimes” as consulting a traditional 
healer without authorization, refusing to use a modern cooking stove, lack-
ing a table in one’s home for the storage of cooking utensils, or appearing 
in public with soiled clothing or evidence of inadequate personal hygeine.
 Undoubtedly, at least one of the underlying objectives of the proposed 
measures is laudable: increasing the standards of health and hygiene in the 
country. However, the result would be that a significant number of rural 
dwellers might look less poor and “traditional,” but would be and feel as 
poor, or even poorer than, before.14 For example, a current policy direc-
tive throughout the country mandates the wearing of shoes in public. Not 
wearing shoes means exclusion from public places such as markets and be-
ing turned away from official government functions. Yet peasants often do 
not have the financial means to adhere to this rule, and sometimes end 
up in the local cachot (jail) as a result. Obligatory fines of 10,000 Rwandan 
francs are not adjusted to the circumstances of rural life, and thus the only 
strategy for regaining freedom is to borrow money from family and friends, 
resulting in debt and more poverty. Another strategy is to follow the spirit, if 
not the letter, of the policy and participate in the project of image control. 
During fieldwork we noticed men and women walking to official gather-
ings and carrying their shoes on their heads. The purchase of new shoes 
as required by official policy had represented a serious investment, and 
these possessions had to be handled with care. Only when approaching the 
area where government officials were located (sometimes in the company 
of foreign visiters inspecting a “project” or some other “developmental” 
initiative) would they put on their shoes. Then, after the meeting and out 
of sight of the eyes of the state and the foreigners, the shoes would be re-
moved and placed back on the head. 
The Ethics of Dissimulation
The official control over the aesthetics of display means that the images of 
progress that one sees in Rwanda—either while roaming the central bou-
levards of Kigali or visiting a “project” in the provincial towns of Gisenyi or 
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Butare—turn out to be superficial and misleading. Even a longer residence 
in rural Rwanda devoted to collecting “stories,” seeing things from a bot-
tom-up perspective, and going beyond official discourse and window-dress-
ing is likely to present its own difficulties. The same ideological framework 
that represents the public face of the government has been widely propa-
gated in the countryside by awareness campaigns and during meetings with 
authorities and military commanders. This has established a far-reaching 
practice of self-censorship among the population with regard to elements 
Table 1. System of Fines
Forbidden or Compulsory Activity
FINE 
(RWF)
1 Tending livestock on “public places” 10.000
2 Cultivating on riverbeds 10.000
3 Refusal to dig anti-erosion canals 10.000
4 Absence of roof gutter and receptacle near house 10.000
5 “Having” a second wife 10.000
6 Churches without chapel (building) 10.000
7 Religious groups praying at night 10.000
8 Refusal to participate in nocturnal security patrols 10.000
9 Parents who refuse to send children to school 10.000
10 Teacher or other person sending child from school for not paying tuition fee 10.000
11 Consulting traditional “healer” without authorization 10.000
12 Cutting trees without permission 10.000
13 Heating wood to fabricate charcoal 10.000
14 Selling wood products without authorization 10.000
15 Refusal to make/use a “modern cooking stove” 10.000
16 Selling home made products like cheese, milk, etc, without authorization 10.000
17 House without compost bin 2.000
18 House without clothesline 2.000
19 House without closed toilet 2.000
20 House without table to put cooking utensils 2.000
21 House without conservation place for drinking water 2.000
22 Someone without clean clothing & body hygiene 2.000
23 Teacher without clean clothing & body hygiene 10.000
24 Consumption of beers in cabarets or at home with straw 10.000
25 Commercial centre without toilet 10.000
26 Restaurant without toilets or not clean 10.000
27 School compound not clean 10.000
28 Health centre without hygiene 10.000
29 Market with no toilets and/or not clean 10.000
Source: Letter from a district mayor addressed to the executive secretaries at the sector level 
(fieldwork observation, Northern Province, June 2006)
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that do not fit into the official public transcript. Official policy not only 
controls the hygiene of bodies, but also the hygiene of minds. Although 
this may in some sense be a legitimate goal considering the hate campaign 
that engulfed the country in the beginning of the 1990s, the policies of “re-
education” also involve a considerable degree of “political indoctrination” 
(Mgbako 2005). 
 When Danielle de Lame conducted fieldwork in Rwanda in the late 
1980s, she noticed that all public gatherings—whether festive religious 
events, ritualized public drinking activities, or “politico-private” gather-
ings—“serve to transmit meaning, provide the instruments of memoriza-
tion, and create consensus” (2005:303). What she saw as a cultural predilec-
tion for consensus was of course encouraged and enhanced after the 1994 
genocide as part of the massive effort to restore order and maintain securi-
ty. Sensitization campaigns, commemoration ceremonies, speeches by dig-
nitaries, and reeducation programs—the so-called Ingando and Itorero—are 
intended not only to eradicate “genocide ideology,” but also to promote a 
specific image of Rwanda.15 These efforts to control people’s thoughts are 
not only taking place on specific occasions but have become a continuous 
process. The weekly Umuganda communal labor activities, for example, are 
carried out at the local level, but they conclude with a speech delivered by 
centrally appointed leaders on a theme chosen by the government and pub-
lished in the official gazette. All of these activities have naturally instilled a 
high degree of self-censorship among the Rwandan peasant population.16 
 There are several components of this “rehearsed consensus.” To begin 
with, there is the notion of “Rwandanicity” or “Rwandanness,” which asserts 
that before the arrival of colonialism Rwandans were one unified people 
(Republic of Rwanda 2006a:167–85). According to this narrative, the co-
lonial powers divided what had been a harmonious and egalitarian society 
into different ethnic groups in order to rule on the basis of these divisions. 
And these divisions, in turn, were the starting point for the genocide that 
culminated in the 1994 mass slaughter of Tutsi. A second component con-
sists of praise for the activities of the RPF, which (according to the narra-
tive) stopped this divisionism in its deadly manifestations during the actual 
killings, and continues to do so through its policies in the postgenocide pe-
riod. The RPF abolished ethnicity and created one big family (umuryango) 
for all Rwandans. A third component consists of warnings about the alarm-
ing persistence of “genocide ideology” both inside and outside Rwanda and 
the need to eradicate it. According to this line of thinking, guidance from 
within the liberation movement of the RPF is necessary to fully embrace the 
restored order of “Rwandanicity,” free from the perils of ethnicity and the 
whims of dictatorship. 
 This “rehearsed consensus” is the dominant and dominating discourse 
in postgenocide Rwanda, but it is not necessarily what Rwandans experi-
ence as reality. In addition, just as de Lame noticed a cultural affinity for 
consensus (or the appearance of consensus) among Rwandans, an under-
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standing of the cultural conception of ubwenge is necessary to fully appreci-
ate the nature of their interactions and communication (see de Lame 2004; 
Rukebesha 1985; Overdulve 1997; Ntampaka 1999; Lestrade 1972; Crepeau 
1985).17 This complex notion incorporates a range of elements, though 
in the broadest sense, it refers to a valorization of the kind of intelligence 
that results in public self-control. Ubwenge is both an overall principle struc-
turing behavior and display, and also a specific way of communicating. In 
the traditional organization of Rwandan society, speech acts did not cor-
respond to reality alone, and what one said did not necessarily correspond 
with what one thought. Subtle adjustments could be made according to the 
status differential between the interlocutors or other variables in the broad-
er sociopolitical environment. Language was thus a means to an end, not 
an end in itself. From a Western perspective, the latter would be the truth 
and the former a lie. But in the Rwandan context, truth and lies existed, 
and still exist, in a dialectical relationship. The Rwandan system of com-
munication was (and is) esoteric: statements reveal and conceal at the same 
time. Often, outsiders to Rwandan culture fail to take this into account. 
Conclusion
Any attempt to understand postgenocide Rwanda needs to take into ac-
count the “mise-en-scène” analyzed in this article. The existence of active 
interference in the scientific construction of knowledge implies that even 
the reports one reads in the offices of Kigali and Washington, London, Brus-
sels, Copenhagen, or other capitals around the globe are not always com-
plete or acccurate. As Pottier observed (2002:207), “reality is what Rwanda’s 
political leaders, as moral guardians tell the world . . .  it is.” The Rwandan 
establishment operating at the center of society is crafting a preferred im-
age of the country.18 As we have seen, it actively pursues this objective in 
various ways through the active interference in scientific research projects, 
through the cultivation of an aesthetics of progress, and through the subtle 
use of a complex communication code. 
 Future attempts to generate insights into postgenocide Rwanda require 
innovative approaches if they are to produce useful results. In Rwanda there 
is a second world lying beyond political control or correctness, beyond “re-
hearsed consensus” and the “mise-en-scène.” This second world comes to 
the surface only during “rare moments of political electricity when…the 
hidden transcript is spoken directly and publicly in the teeth of power” 
(Scott 1990:14). In the absence of such events, one has to search for an 
interpretation of the “cryptic and opaque” (Scott 1990:137). One has to 
move beyond appearances and toward the meaning of life in the periphery 
of Rwandan society. Moving away from the center, both physically and men-
tally, is thus an important strategy. It is a difficult, but necessary, exercise. 
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Notes
1. See also conversation between Gourevitch and the editor of The New Yorker at 
www.newyorker.com/online/2009/05/04/090504on_audio_gourevitch. 
2. Also see Scott Straus’s comparative essay (2000) on the books by Gourevitch 
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and Alison Des Forges (1999) on Rwanda.
3. Although Gourevitch did cross the rural–urban divide, his trip into the coun-
tryside consisted of occasional visits to a limited number of localities and only 
a few interviews. In addition, his actual interview procedures may have been 
problematic. At one point Gourevitch’s translator replies to a statement of 
Girumuhatse with the comment “yeah, they all say that.” If this intervention 
took place in the presence of the interlocutor it is, of course, unacceptable, 
since it would likely influence the respondant’s perception of the interviewer 
and the answers he was expected to give. 
4. In the op-ed piece, Gourevitch talks specifically about the inadequacy of photo-
journalism as a record of reality: “Crime-scene photographs, for all their power 
to reveal, can also serve as a distraction, even a deterrent, from precise under-
standing of the events they depict. Photographs cannot show us a chain of com-
mand, or . . .  decision making. Photographs cannot tell stories. They can only 
provide evidence of stories, and evidence is mute: it demands investigation and 
interpretation” (2009b:10). I would like to thank David Newbury for bringing 
this op-ed piece to my attention, as well for suggesting the analogy between 
photographs and “snapshot” narrative portraits.
5. Footnotes 5–7 in the report (p. 17) give concrete examples of instances of 
“genocide ideology” and reveal its conceptually wide-ranging scope. 
6. This article focuses on scientific research, although freedom of the press is 
also under pressure in Rwanda. See Waldorf (2007). One also has to take into 
account that one needs to have permission from the relevant governmental 
bodies to conduct field research in Rwanda. Therefore, certain research activi-
ties are never undertaken or are adapted so that their predicted outcomes will 
be in line with the official policy and “vision.” Apart from the examples referred 
to here involving international (research) institutions, several examples can be 
cited of researchers who in the context of academic research ran into seri-
ous trouble with the Rwandan authorities, especially while doing research with 
“ordinary people” in the countryside. One researcher was forced to undergo 
a a “reeducation” tour after presenting the preliminary results of her findings. 
See Thomson (2009a). 
7. Filip Reyntjens (2007:6) refers to this way of handling things as “a characteristic 
of dictatorships more interested in their international image then the survival 
of their population” (translation by the author).
8. Author’s interview with a Rwandan field researcher who was part of the “quali-
tative” research group and study. The qualitative study and the existence of 
the results were confirmed by an official of the National Service of the Gacaca 
courts (interview, Kigali, April 2007). A field guide containing the questions 
used during focus group discussions is on file with the author.
9. Interview with official of the National Service of the Gacaca Courts, Kigali, 
April 2007.
10. I was employed as a long-term consultant for the World Bank and stationed in 
Rwanda at the time. Together with two other foreign researchers, I was super-
vising the design and implementation of the study and the fieldwork activities 
in the Rwandan countryside.
11. Initially, police officers and other security agents had placed a significant num-
ber of the enumerators and employees of the logistical partner under surveil-
lance and seized all the data in their possession. During negotiations between 
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the World Bank and the Rwandan authorities, half of the data were in the pos-
session of the security forces and half of the data remained in the possession 
of the World Bank. Eventually, the study was terminated by the government of 
Rwanda after an agreement with the World Bank management. All data were 
jointly destroyed after the negotiations.
12. A similar observation was made in an evaluation of the 2000–2005 DFID country 
program in Rwanda, which was characterized as “insufficiently informed about 
implementation realities on the ground” (DFID Evaluation report EV660, cited 
in Holvoet & Rombouts 2008:592).
13. Because local authorities are appointed, the chain of accountability goes 
upward toward higher authorities and not downward to the population. As a 
result, local administrative personnel implement orders received from the cen-
tral government in Kigali. On the nature of the local government structure and 
the experience of political representation, see Ingelaere (2007a:36–41; 2010). 
14. This theme is further developed in Ansoms (2009). The engineering aspect 
of the Rwandan postgenocide regime is also documented in my description 
(Ingelaere 2006:29–91) of rural life on one hill in central Rwanda.
15. For a detailed discussion of this ideological framework and the search for the 
“truth” during the Gacaca activities, see Ingelaere (2009).
16. The Kinyarwandan word Kwibwizira refers to this practice of autocensorship. 
It expresses the idea that people do what authorities want them to do without 
explicit instruction or coercion.
17. This perception also is based on my own field experience and information 
gathered during fieldwork.
18. An example is the comment made by the Rwandan governor of the southern 
province on the (illegal) deportation from Burundi of Rwandans seeking refu-
gee status there; the presence of these people in Burundi,” he said, “was dam-
aging the image of Rwanda …” (Human Rights Watch 2009). 

